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Recent Cases
DOMESTIc RELATIONS-AGE OF MAJORITY STATUTE-EIGHTEEN OR
TwENTY-ONE?-Plaintiff, an eighteen-ytar-old resident of Jefferson
County, Kentucky, applied to defendant county court clerk for a mar-
riage license. Defendant refused to issue the license on the ground
that Kentucky law1 requires a person under twenty-one years of age to
have parental consent before he or she can obtain such a permit.
Plaintiff then sued to compel issuance of a marriage license to her
without parental consent by reason of the adult status conferred upon
eighteen-year-olds by Ky. Rev. Stat. 2.015 [hereinafter referred to as
KRS],2 enacted in 1964 by the General Assembly.3 The lower court
ordered the defendant county court clerk to issue the license and
further declared that eighteen-year-olds were entitled to the issuance
of a marriage license without parental consent. Held: Reversed. The
amendments which were added to KRS 2.015 before it passed the Ken-
tucky Legislature and which substituted eighteen years of age for
twenty-one years of age in five particular statutes4 limit the meaning
of the phrase "for all purposes" appearing in section one; thus KRS
2.015 applies only to those statutes which do not designate age in
terms of a precise number of years. Commonwealth v. Hallahan, 391
S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1965).
The Court erroneously interpreted the statute, since the Legislature
obviously intended to establish eighteen years as the age at which all
1 "If either of the parties is under twenty-one years of age and not before
married, no license shall issue without the consent of his or her father or guardian,
or if there is none or he is absent from the state, without the consent of his or her
mother, personally given or certified in writing to the clerk over the signature of
the father, guardian or mother, attested by two subscribing witnesses and proved
by the oath of one of the witnesses, administered by the clerk. If the parties are
personally unknown to the clerk, a license shall not issue until bond, with good
surety, in the penalty of one hundred dollars is given to the Commonwealth, with
cond'tion that there is no lawful cause to obstruct the marriage." Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 402.210 (1942) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 Persons of the age of eighteen years are of the age of majority for all
purposes in this Commonwealth except for the purchase of alcoholic beverages
and for purposes of care and treatment of handicapped children, for which
twenty-one years is the age of majority."
3 1964 Ky. SENATE JOURN. 56-70, 91-93. Judging from the legislative history
of the bill, the 1964 General Assembly apparently gave little thought to the broad
implications which would inevitably result from its passage. In the Senate, the
bill was allotted only one day of consideration in committee and was passed
unanimously only four-days later. -Similar treatment was afforded by the House
of Representatives.
4 KRS § 385.010 (1958); KRS § 389010 (1944); KRS § 394.020 (1942);
KRS § 394.030 (1942); KRS § 405.390 (1950).
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but two specified disabilities of minority are removed. This is shown
by an analysis of the two bases on which the decision is founded.
The Court's first basis is a rule of statutory construction: "Before
a statute will be considered amended by implication by a later statute,
the two statutes must be repugnant to each other and be irreconcilable,
or the latter act must cover the whole subject of the earlier act."5
(Emphasis added.) Here, the Court's position would seem to be de-
feated by its own rule. The majority statute6 clearly indicates the
Legislature's intention to "cover the whole subject of the act,"7 since
it provides that eighteen years is the age of majority "for all purposes"
except the purchase of alcoholic beverages and the care of handi-
capped children.
A more appropriate rule of construction, readily applicable to the
majority statute, may be found in Gateway Constr. Co. v. Wallbaum:
"the primary rule is to ascertain the intention [of the Legislature]
from the words employed in enacting the statute and not to guess
what the Legislature may have intended but did not express."s Ap-
plication of the Gateway rule would have led the Hallahan Court to
the proper decision.
The second basis of the Court's decision concerns sections two
through six of the majority statute, which substitute eighteen years for
tventy-one years in five other enumerated statutes.9 The Court
reasoned that, if section one impliedly modifies other majority pro-
visions generally, these enumerations are without purpose. Thus, had
the Legislature intended to modify KRS 402.210, it would have made
this change explicit also.
However, in light of the plain language of the majority statute,
the reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature intended the two
exceptions in section one to be exclusive, and that sections two through
six were intended to implement the "for all purposes" mandate in a
few important specimen areas.
Consider the case of Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Queenan,0 in
which the Court faced a similar problem in relation to Kentucky's
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and reached a result op-
posite to that in Hallahan. Although the General Assembly had at-
5.391 S.W.2d 378, 379.
6 KRS § 2.015 (1965).
7 391 S.W.2d 378, 379.
8 356 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Ky. 1962). See also Fryman v. Electric Steam
Radiator Corp., 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955); Reed v. Greene, 243 S.V.2d 892(Kv. 1951); Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Fritz, 236
S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1950).
9 Statutes cited note 4 supra.
103 44 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
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tempted to enumerate all the statutes affected by the Code, inevitably
a few were overlooked. The Court in Queenan concluded that the
Code's passage amended or repealed even those statutes which escaped
notice." The same reasoning applies to KRS 2.015. It seems obvious
that the marriage statute12 was left off the list of statutes specifically
amended, not from deliberate legislative choice, but merely as a
result of the impossibility of ferreting out all the sections affected by
lowering the age of majority.
In reaching the result in Hallahan, the Court seemingly accepted
the appellant's contention that generic terms denoting the age of
majority and the phrase "twenty-one years of age" mean two dif-
ferent things.1 3 However, the Legislature does not ordinarily make this
distinction, as shown by the statutes concerning marriage.
The law provides that a marriage license can be issued to a female
only in the county of her residence, unless she is "of full age."1 4 Under
the Court's interpretation of the majority statute, "full age" is eighteen
years. However, an applicant must have parental consent until she
reaches "twenty-one."15
Despite the use of different terminology, both sections are clear
expressions of the same policy, the protection of minors. To pass a
statute permitting women of eighteen years to obtain a license in any
county while retaining the parental consent requirement for those
under twenty-one is inconsistent, and such an interpretation of legis-
lative intent is illogical. Rather, it would seem that the difference in
terminology resulted from chance and that the General Assembly made
no distinction between "of full age" and "twenty-one." The synonomy
of the two terms was further indicated by the Court itself in Combs v.
Commonwealth, when it said, "[W] e have a general, broad expression
of policy, in KRS 402.210, against marriage of minors without parental
consent."16 (Emphasis added.) Thus, the Court has in fact recognized
the Legislature's interchanging use of generic and specific terms for
age in marriage statutes, although it did not do so in Hallahan.
"Id. at 385: "Article 10 of the act adopting the Code (Chapter 77, Acts of
1958) repealed several chapters and sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes by
specific reference. However, as counsel for the intervenor General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation has expressed it, 'the search for an express repeal of specific
inconsistent statutory provisions on such a scale is a formidable and exacting task.'
It is inevitable that the unfolding years will witness the discovery of inconsistencies
and obsolete matter that escaped initial detection and will reveal 'knotty halfway
related points' between pre-existing statutes and the provisions of the Code."
12 KRS § 402.210 (1942).
13 Brief for Appellant, pp. 8-12.
14 KRS § 402.080 (1942).
15 KRS § 402.210 (1942).
16 283 S.W.2d 714, 715 (Ky. 1955).
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The greatest disadvantage of the Hallahan decision is that it leaves
many areas of Kentucky law in a state of confusion. For instance, can
any eighteen-year-old Kentucky resident now petition for adoption
of a child?'7 Can he change his name?'- The Hallahan opinion rightly
urges the General Assembly to either clarify or repeal the majority
statute.1" The Legislature should repeal it at the first opportunity,
carefully determine the areas in which an eighteen-year-old is capable
of exercising sound judgment, and then draft a new statute-one
designed to implement its intentions without confusion.
Steven L. Beshear
DOMfESTIC RELATIONS-THE VALIDrTY OF FoREIGN DIVORCES. - Two
New York women, Susan Rosenstiel and Helena Wood, obtained bi-
lateral divorces' in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico. Each married again,
and in later actions concerning the second marriage 2 the prior Mexi-
37 KRS § 199.470 (1950).
"AKRS § 401.020 (1964). See also KRS § 387.020 (1942); KRS § 387.040(1942); KRS § 387.080 (1942); KRS § 391.020 (1942); KRS 391.030 (1942);
KRS § 405.010 (1942); KRS § 405.020 (1942); KRS § 405.080 (1942); KRS §
411.150 (1942).
Aside from problems concerning statutory law are the possible effects of
KRS § 2.015 upon certain common law principles. For example, consider a situa-
tion which has only recently arisen in Kentucky concerning the family purpose
doctrine. An eighteen ear old, living with his parents, purchased an automobile
in his own name and later, while driving, was involved in an accident in which
a passenger in his car was injured. He had no income or insurance coverage. Two
questions immediately arise: 1) can an eighteen-year-old now legally contract for
the purchase of a car, and 2) does the fact that he is eighteen years old now ex-
clude the application of the family purpose doctrine in the above situation?
For a discussion of two other problems involving the age of majority in re-
lation to the common law, see 65 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 67 (1965); 65 Ops. A-r'y GEN.
41 (1965).
19 Having been made aware of the difficulties inherent in KRS § 2.015 by
the reactions of the Court and the public, a few members of tho 1966 General
Assembly attempted to either clarify or repeal the statute by the introduction of
several bills; however, each proposal was either voted down or tabled. 1966
Final Legislative Record 14, 28, 30.
I The bi-lateral divorce is obtained in Juarez by one party to the marriage
crossing into that city and signing the Municipal Register, an official book of
residents of the city. The plantiff then files with the district court a certificate
showing such registration and a petition for divorce. Later. the defendant ap-
pears in the court by an attorney duly authorized to act in his behalf and admits
the allegations of the complaint. The divorce decree, which is recognized as valid
in Chihuahua, is then made. Stern. Mexican Divorce-The Mexican Law, Pnc.
LAW., May 1961, pp. 78-82; Berke, Mexican Divorces, PRAC. LAw., March
1961, pp. 84-86. In Wood v. Wood, however, the plaintiff did not sign the
Municipal Register but personallv submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Wood
v. Wood. 41 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
2 Mrs. Wood sued for a separation decree from her second husband, who
counterclaimed for an annulment or a separation. Wood v. Wood, 41 Misc. 2d 95,
245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Mrs. Rosenstiel's husband was asling the court
(Continued on next page)
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can divorces were attacked as invalid in New York. The Supreme Court
of New York County refused to give recognition to this type of
divorce. 3 On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed
the decisions,4 and the cases were presented to the Court of Appeals.
Held: affirmed. The Mexican bi-lateral divorce will be recognized as
valid in New York. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d
709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965); Wood v. Wood, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d
709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
A divorce judgment from a foreign country, to be recognized as a
matter of comity in New York, must not offend the public policy of the
State,5 i.e., "the law of the state, whether found in the Constitution,
the statutes, or judicial record."0 The public policy of New York as
stated in the judicial record had never failed, until Wood and Rosen-
siel were decided in the lower courts of the state, to uphold the
validity of the Mexican bi-lateral divorce,7 while barring the so-called
"mail order '8 and "ex parte"9 divorces. The courts concluded that the
bi-lateral divorce should be recognized, even when the parties go from
their home state to a foreign country for the express purpose of ob-
taining a divorce on grounds not recognized in New York.10 The Court
of Appeals, in Rosenstiel, stated that a balanced public policy requires
New York to recognize the bi-lateral divorce, although no domicile of
either party is shown in Mexico."
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
to annul his marriage on the grounds that the Mexican divorce she had obtained
from her first husband was invalid in New York. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43
Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
'Wood v. Wood,'41 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1963);
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
4 Wood v. Wood, 253 N.Y.S.2d 204 (App. Div. 1964); Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (App. Div. 1964).
5 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375, 130 N.E.2d 902, 903
(1955).
6 Glazer v. Glazer, 276 N.Y. 296, 302, 12 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1938).7 Weibel v. Weibel, 37 Misc. 2d 162, 234 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Busk v. Busk, 229 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (not otherwise reported);
Skolnick v. Skolnick, 24 Misc. 2d 1077, 204 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Bowen
v. Bowen, 22 Misc. 2d 496, 195 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Fricke v. Bech-
told. 8 Misc. 2d 844, 168 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Costi v. Costi, 133
N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (not otherwise reported); Mountain v. Mountain,
109 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (not otherwise reported); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
194 Misc. 73. 85 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1949).8 Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948); Querze v.
Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943). The "mail order" divorce is obtained
by sending the power of attorney to Mexico and neither party appearing before
the Mexican court.
9 Maltese v. Maltese, 32 Misc. 2d 993, 224 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
The "ex parte" divorce is obtained by the presence of one party before the
Mexican court without the other party's attorney.
10 Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 36, 47 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1943).
11 Rosenst:el v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 73-74, 209 N.E.2d 709, 713, 262
N.Y.S.2d 86, 90.
[Vol. 55,
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The argument against recognition of such a divorce is based on
this lack of domicile and the fact that residence may be established
merely by observing a statutory formality. There is no dispute that the
Chihuahua court acquires jurisdiction under its own laws. But those
against recognition feel that Chihuahua does not acquire jurisdiction as
New York understands that term. The contention is that because the
residence requirements in the state of Chihuahua are minimal and
neither spouse has to obtain a valid domicile, jurisdictional power
based on the semblance of domicile is inadequate basis for a decree. 12
New York, however, had recognized a divorce granted in France
between parties who were not domiciled there but were residents of
New York.' 3 The court in Wood and Rosenstiel relied on this decision
to dispose of the jurisdictional and domicilary argument, concluding
that domicile is not an indispensable prerequisite to jurisdiction. Fur-
ther, the court felt that New York's public policy would be affected
no differently by the one day formality in Mexico than by the six
weeks necessary to gain residence in Nevada; thus recognition should
not be withheld in the first instance while being granted in the
latter.' 4
Although the Wood and Rosenstiel decisions are based on a pro-
cedural problem-i.e., the question of the jurisdiction of the Mexican
court over the parties-the conclusion that a divorce decree from
Chihuahua does not offend the public policy of New York liberalized
the substantive law of the state. Whether purposely or not, the court
eased the restrictions placed on divorce by the strict New York
statute.15 The instant cases could have been resolved without causing
such a consequence of the decision; the question of recognition did
not have to be decided, since each husband had known before his
marriage of the prior Mexican divorce of his wife. The cases could have
been decided by the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 6
Whether this impact on the substantive law of divorce was a motive
behind the court's decisions is of little consequence now; shortly after
Wood and Rosenstiel, the New York legislature amended the divorce
12 Id. at 75-76, 209 N.E.2d at 714, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (separate opinion).
'3 Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E.2d 490 (1923). The French court,however, applied New York law and granted the divorce on the ground of
adultery.
14 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 74, 209 N.E.2d 709, 712, 262
N.Y.S.2d 86, 91.
1 N.Y. Domf. REL.. LAW § 170, as amended, N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1966, ch. 254,§ 170. The statute, which formerly allowed one ground for divorce, adultery.
has been amended to include new grounds for divorce. See note 17 infra.
10 Wood v. Wood, 253 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (App. Div. 1964) (concurring
opinion); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 253 N.Y.S.2d 206, 210 (App. Div. 1964)
(concurring opinion).
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statute to include additional grounds for divorce.' 7 Simultaneously,
however, the legislature set forth the public policy of New York in
regard to divorces obtained outside the state by New York residents.',
Since neither section of the new statute becomes effective until
September 1, 1967, New York couples seeking a divorce before that
time on grounds other than adultery will still have to go outside the
state for the divorce. It is clear from the statute that the Wood and
Rosenstiel decisions will validate a Mexican bi-lateral divorce obtained
before the effective date of the statute. It is equally clear that divorces
obtained from the Mexican courts by New York residents after that
date will not be recognized in New York.
The statute will also affect divorces granted to New York residents
by sister-states, and New York will probably look more closely to
determine if a bona fide residence was established in the state granting
the decree. The requirements of the faith and credit clause do not
bar examination by another state of the jurisdictional bases, including
domicile, upon which a divorce decree from a sister-state was issued.
If jurisdiction is found lacking, then full faith and credit need not
be given.19
'7 N.Y. SESS. LAWS 1966, ch. 254, § 170. The grounds now available for
divorce in New York are: (1) cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by
defendant such that conduct by defendant so endangers the physical and mental
well being of the plaintiff as to render it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to
cohabit with defendant; (2) abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for a
period of two or more years; (3) confinement of defendant to prison for three or
more consecutive years after the marriage; (4) adultery, which now is defined as
an act of sexual or deviant sexual intercourse; (5) separation of husband and
wife pursuant to a decree of separation for a period of two years after issuance of
such decree, providing satisfactory proof hasbeen submitted by the plaintiff that
he or she has performed all the terms and conditions of such decree; (6) separa-
tion of husband and wife pursuant to a written agreement of separation, sub-
scribed and acknowledged by the parties thereto in the form required to enttle
a deed to be recorded, for a period of two years after execution of the agree-
ment, providing satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or
she has duly performed all the terms and conditions of such agreement. Such
agreement shall be filed in the office of the county wherein either party resides
within thirty days after execution thereof.
Is N.Y. SEsS. LAws 1966, ch. 254, § 250. This section states that proof that
a person obtaining a divorce in another jurisdiction was (1) domiciled in New
York within twelve months prior to commencing the proceedings and resumed
residence within eighteen months after his departure from the state, or (2) at
all times maintained alace of residence in the state, shall be prima facie evidence
that the person was domiciled in the state when the divorce proceedings com-
menced. The provisions of this section do not apply to a divorce obtained in
another jurisdiction prior to September 1, 1967.
'9Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See generally Annot.,
28 A.L.R.2d 1303 (1953); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1385 (1948). In a recent Ken-
tucky case, Hanshew v. Mullins, 385 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1964), the Court of Ap-
peals stated that jurisdiction of a sister-state to render a divorce was always open
to inquiry by the courts of Kentucky. Further, the Kentucky Court stated that a
divorce judgment in which jurisdiction of the parties has not been obtained or
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 55,
RECENT CASES
Liberalization of the grounds for divorce should be accompanied
by a stricter policy towards recognition of divorces obtained in one
jurisdiction by residents of another. Now that the cause which has
sent New York couples to foreign courts for "quickie" divorces has
been alleviated, there is less need to recognize such divorces. Further,
the legislature of New York has clearly established the state's public
policy concerning recognition of foreign divorces, and New York
residents must abide by this decision.
William T. Cain
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO PuI3LIC TRIAL-TOTAL EXCLUSION
EXCEPT TE BAR AND PEss.-Defendant was convicted of indecent as-
sault of a female. After the jury had been sworn and the prosecution
had finished its opening statement, the state asked the court to exclude
from the courtroom all spectators except members of the bar and press
and all witnesses not on the stand. This motion was granted over the
defendant's objection. Held: Reversed and remanded. Excluding all
spectators except the bar and press because salacious testimony is
expected violates the defendant's constitutional right' to a public
trial. State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966).
An evaluation of the Schmit case requires consideration of the
following questions.
1. What constitutes a public trial?
2. What leeway does the criminal trial court have in excluding the
public or a portion thereof?
3. Must the accused show specific prejudice caused by the exclusion?
The courts do not agree as to what constitutes a public trial. Some
jurisdictions hold it simply to be "not secret,"2 while others, like Min-
nesota, hold that a criminal trial must be free for the public to attend
if it desires and that the doors of the courtroom should not be
closed.3
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
in which neither party was domiciled in the state is void and subject to collateral
attack, and another state need not give full faith and credit to the decree. For
discussion of the Kentucky domestic relations law, see Whiteside, Ten Years of
Kentucky Domestic Relations Law, 1955-1965, 54 Ky. L.J. 206 (1966).
1 MIN. CONST. art. 1, § 6. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial."2 Keddington v. State, 19 Ariz. 457, 459, 172 Pac. 273, 274 (1918). Cf.,
Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958); Callahan v. United States,
240 Fed. 683 (9th Cir. 1917); State v. Croak, 167 La. 92, 94, 118 So. 703, 704
(1928).3 People v. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242, 245, 37 Pac. 153, 154 (1894); State v.
Schrnit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Minn. 1966).
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